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¡Si Hubo Genocidio en Guatemala! Yes! There Was Genocide in Guatemala¹

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Victoria Sanford

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The army came with their guns. The people they found, they killed. The crops they came upon, they destroyed. Our clothes, our dishes, our tools, they broke them or stole them. And all our animals, our cows, goats, chickens and turkeys, they killed them too. They destroyed and ate everything on the path of their persecutions against the people.

Alejandro, Ixil massacre survivor²

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Introduction

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The quantitative and qualitative toll of more than three decades of internal armed conflict was largely unknown in December 1996 when the Guatemalan army and URNG³ guerrillas signed the historic Peace Accords. Indeed, the number and severity of human rights violations had been a hotly contested issue with numbers of dead and disappeared varying widely from 40,000 to 100,000 and everywhere in between. Likewise, the number of village massacres varied from 100 to 440.⁴ Regardless of whether one pointed to the high or low end of these estimates, there was no doubt that grave human rights violations had taken place in Guatemala. Ward Churchill⁵ and Ricardo Falla⁶ were among the first to charge genocide in Guatemala and to do so with as much data as they could gather during the conflict. Still, when the concept of genocide was used to describe what was taking place in Guatemala, in the Cold War context, this description, like any analysis focused exclusively on army atrocities, was mostly dismissed as guerrilla or indigenista propaganda. Since the signing of the Peace Accords, however, genocide is a legal term that has been used by the Commission for Historical Clarification ([CEH] truth commission) in its report, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court in its 2004 ruling against the Guatemalan state, and most recently by the Spanish Court in its 2006 international arrest warrant for generals implicated in the genocide.

1 Thus the historiography of genocide in Guatemala is one in the making. In this
2 chapter, I draw on these documents, survivor testimonies, and other primary
3 and secondary resources to provide the reader with an overview of the
4 Guatemalan genocide and, thus, contribute to this burgeoning historiography.
5

6 **From militarization to genocide**

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8 In 1978, the Guatemalan army garnered international attention when it opened
9 fire on a group of unarmed Q'eqchi' Maya peasants protesting for land and killed
10 dozens of men, women and children in what became known as the Panzos mas-
11 sacre. That same year, the Guatemalan army also began a selective campaign of
12 political disappearance and assassination in Guatemala City and other urban and
13 rural centres.⁷ In tandem, it accelerated construction of military bases through-
14 out rural Guatemala. Prior to 1979, the army had divided the country into nine
15 military zones, each with a large army base in its centre. By 1982, the army had
16 designated each of the 22 departments as a military zone accompanied by mul-
17 tiple army bases in municipalities and army garrisons in villages throughout the
18 country.⁸ Forced recruitment into the Guatemalan army ensured the requisite
19 number of troops for this extension of the military infrastructure.⁹ In 1982
20 troops were increased from 27,000 to 36,000.¹⁰ Some of these large army bases,
21 such as those in Rabinal and Nebaj, are structures that have endured to the date
22 of this writing. Other more temporary locations, such as the churches in San
23 Andrés Sajcabajá, Acul, Sacapulas, Joyabaj, Zacualpa, San Pedro Jocopilas, Nebaj,
24 Chajul, Cotzal, Uspantán, Chiché, Canillá and the Marist monastery of
25 Chichicastenango, which were used by the army as jails, torture and interroga-
26 tion centres, and clandestine cemeteries, no longer house the army.¹¹

27 This expanded army presence was accompanied by an acceleration of army
28 violence, from selective assassinations to disappearances to multiple village
29 massacres.¹² Within the United Nations system, these army operations of
30 disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, inhuman and degrading
31 treatment and punishment, and arbitrary detention violated numerous articles
32 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
33 Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICPR) and the Convention Against
34 Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.¹³
35 Some articles of some conventions are derogable, meaning that a signatory
36 (state party to the convention) can sign on to the convention, covenant or pro-
37 tocol, on the condition of not being held to the standard of particular articles
38 which the state party identifies as derogations prior to signing. Articles 6 and 7
39 of the ICPR, which guarantee the right to life and freedom from torture,
40 respectively, are non-derogable. Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention Against
41 Torture provide for no exceptions ever permitting torture: 'No exceptional
42 circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability of any other public emergency, may be invoked as a

1 justification for torture.¹⁴ The Guatemalan army operations also violated
2 Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights to which
3 Guatemala was one of the founding signatories in 1969. Articles 3, 4 and 5,
4 which guarantee the right to juridical personality, right to life and freedom
5 from torture, respectively, are all non-derogable. Indeed, army operations of
6 terror against the Maya systematically violated these international human
7 rights contracts to which Guatemala is a signatory.¹⁵

8 When the Guatemalan army shifted its strategy of repression from selective
9 assassination to large-scale killings, it shifted its strategy to a prolonged series
10 of genocidal campaigns against the Maya. These genocidal campaigns began
11 with selective massacres in Maya villages all over the country and soon shifted
12 to massacres of entire communities. It is when this shift happens that the
13 Guatemalan army's human rights violations are no longer limited to the above-
14 mentioned human rights instruments.¹⁶ It is here that the army moves to a
15 new level of atrocity and violates the Convention on the Prevention and
16 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.¹⁷

17 Critical to understanding why these massacres constitute the beginning of an
18 intentional genocidal campaign is the fact that massacres were not a singular tac-
19 tic of the army. In fact, there were three planned army campaigns of genocide **AQ1**
20 against the Maya (Sanford 2003a, b). The army's first campaign of genocide com-
21 bined massacres with a 'scorched earth' campaign strategy that included the com-
22 plete destruction of the Maya – the people, the villages, their livestock, their
23 homes and their sacred milpa. The army's second genocidal campaign centered
24 on the relentless hunt for and slaughter of massacre survivors; this campaign
25 included army helicopters dropping bombs upon displaced civilians in the moun-
26 tains and ground troops encircling and firing upon those fleeing aerial attacks.
27 The third genocidal campaign was the simultaneous forced concentration of
28 Maya survivors into army-controlled 're-education camps' and 'model villages',
29 and the continued hunt for massacre survivors who had fled to the mountains.

30 In this chapter, I demonstrate how selective massacres as a strategy of state
31 terror systematically shifted to a tripartite, decade-long campaign of genocide
32 against the Maya. I provide evidence to prove that (1) each of the three cam-
33 paigns of genocide I have identified is a clear violation of the UN Genocide
34 Convention; (2) each of these campaigns was designed and implemented with
35 the intention of genocide; (3) the Guatemalan army genocide was not unique,
36 but rather fits a pattern of genocide wherein its intellectual authors and pepe-
37 rators use code words and expressions, such as 'scorching communists',
38 in order to detract from and neutralize their genocidal activities in their
39 attempts to 'render them acceptable domestically and internationally';¹⁸ and
40 (4) former dictators Romeo Lucas Garcia and Efraim Rios Montt in collusion
41 with General Hector Gramajo were the intellectual authors of the massacres
42 which they designed, implemented and supervised in army campaigns against
the Maya with the intention to commit genocide.

1 **Repression and La Violencia**

2
3 At the height of La Violencia, army justification of massacres in rural Maya
4 communities rested upon its claims that the army was, in the words of former
5 military dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, 'scorching communists'.¹⁹ Moreover, the
6 transnational nature of the Guatemalan army's campaign against the Maya was
7 revealed in a 5 October 1981 Department of State Memorandum classified as
8 **Secret**. The memorandum acknowledged that then-dictator General Romeo
9 Lucas García believed that 'the policy of repression' was 'working', and the
10 state department official writing the memo described the 'extermination of the
11 guerrillas, their supporters and sympathizers' as the measure of a 'successful'
12 policy of repression.²⁰ The Guatemalan army used ground troops and aerial
13 forces to saturate the mountains with firepower in its attempt to exterminate
14 the unarmed Maya men, women, children and elderly who had fled the mas-
15 sacres and destruction in their communities.

16 In late 1982, prior to a meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and
17 General Ríos Montt, a confidential US State Department document reported
18 that in 'March 1982, the current President Ríos Montt came to power as
19 expected' and pointed out that 'he quickly consolidated his power' and began
20 'to implement a rigorous counterinsurgency offensive.'²¹ Nevertheless, the State
21 Department officer writing the memo acknowledged that 'Ríos Montt does not
22 have a strong base of power ... We would like to be able, therefore to support
23 Ríos Montt over the short term. ...'²² At the same time, the document acknowl-
24 edged 'that the military continues to engage in massacres of civilians in the
25 countryside'.²³

27 **The Impact of La Violencia²⁴**

29 Known impact of	Findings of CEH final report
30 violence before CEH	
31 440 villages massacred	626 villages massacred
32 1.5 million people displaced	1.5 million people displaced
33 150,000 people fled into external refuge	150,000 people fled to refuge in Mexico
34 100,000–150,000 dead or disappeared	More than 200,000 dead or disappeared

35 *Who were the Victims of La Violencia?*


36 The Vast Majority of the Victims of Acts of Violence Committed by the State were
37 Civilians.

38 83 percent of Victims were Maya	17 percent of Victims were Ladino
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39 *Who is Responsible for These Acts of Violence against Civilians?*

41 93 percent of Acts of Violence Committed 42 by State	3 percent of Acts of Violence Committed by Guerrilla
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Source: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.1 Command responsibility for acts of violence

In its final report, the CEH concluded that army massacres had destroyed 626 villages, that more than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared, that 1.5 million were displaced by the violence, and that more than 150,000 were driven to seek refuge in Mexico. Further, the Commission found the state responsible for 93 percent of the acts of violence and the guerrillas for 3 percent (See Chart 21.1).

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Defining Genocide


In the Genocide Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, 'genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹²⁵

Moreover, Article 1 clearly states that 'genocide, whether committed in time of peace or time of war, is a crime under international law which they [the signatories] undertake to prevent and punish.'

548 *Genocide in Guatemala*

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Source: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.2 Ethnicity of victims

Given that 87 percent of the victims of La Violencia were Maya (See Chart 21.2)²⁶ and that all 626 massacred villages were Maya, there should be no doubt that the Guatemalan army violated the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. In its first campaign of massacres, the army unequivocally killed members of the group, caused serious bodily and mental harm, and deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Maya in whole or in part. Thus, at minimum, the Guatemalan army violated Articles 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Genocide Convention. This alone, however, is not sufficient to prove genocide. Current legal debate about what constitutes genocide resides not just in determining the acts of genocide but also in proving that the acts were 'committed with intent'.²⁷ And, proving intent raises the question about what is acceptable as a standard of proof.

In its final report, the CEH concluded that the Guatemalan army had committed genocidal acts. However, in its discussion of genocide, the CEH wrote:

It is important to distinguish between a policy of genocide and acts of genocide. A policy of genocide exists when the goal of the actions is to exterminate a group in whole or in part. Acts of genocide exist when the goal is political, economic, military, or whatever other such type, and the method that is utilized to achieve the end goal is the extermination of a group in whole or in part.²⁸

Within the CEH interpretation, a policy of genocide has the end goal of genocide whereas acts of genocide are incidental to a plan utilizing these practices

1 but with an end goal of something other than genocide. This CEH interpreta-
2 tion supports my earlier assertion that the Guatemalan army genocide fits a
3 pattern of genocide wherein perpetrators (both individual and institutional)
4 use code words such as 'scorching communists' and other such expressions to
5 neutralize their activities. In this case, rather than genocide, the CEH finds
6 genocidal acts – a finding that is, though ambiguous, nonetheless significant.
7 In addition to pointing out the specific and varied roles of the executive, judi-
8 cial and legislative branches of the Guatemalan government in violating the
9 human rights of its citizens, the CEH attributed direct responsibility to the
10 state and its agents for the construction of the counterinsurgency state and for
11 the state's complete failure to comply with its obligation to investigate and
12 prosecute human rights violations.

13 At the public presentation of the CEH Report in February 1998, CEH
14 President Christian Tomuschat stated:

15
16 On the basis of having concluded that genocide was committed, the
17 Commission also concludes that, without prejudice to the fact that the par-
18 ticipants in the crime include both the material and intellectual authors of
19 the acts of genocide committed in Guatemala, State responsibility also
20 exists. This responsibility arises from the fact that the majority of these acts
21 were the product of a policy pre-established by superior order and commu-
22 nicated to the principal actors.²⁹

23
24 Moreover, we can deconstruct army claims of 'scorching communists' and
25 'killing subversives' as the goal of the genocide by analyzing the army's own
26 words and interpretations of the massacres. Here I offer two declassified US
27 government documents that prove that the genocide was both a means and an
28 end as well as under command responsibility of the hierarchy of the army.

29 First, a **Secret** declassified CIA document from late February 1982, states that
30 in mid-February 1982, the Guatemalan Army has reinforced its existing forces
31 and launched a 'sweep operation in the Ixil Triangle. The commanding officers
32 of the units involved have been instructed to destroy all towns and villages
33 which are cooperating with the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and eliminate
34 all sources of resistance.'³⁰ Point one of the memo claims that civilians 'who
35 agree to collaborate with the army ... will be well treated'. Then, in point three
36 of the memo the CIA acknowledges that 'a large number of guerrillas and
37 collaborators have been killed.' Point three concluded with, 'COMMENT:
38 When an army patrol meets resistance and takes fire from a town or village it
39 is assumed that the entire town is hostile and it is subsequently destroyed. ...
40 An empty village is assumed to have been supporting the EGP, and it is
41 destroyed.' Point four cynically concludes that the Army High Command is
42 'highly pleased with the initial results of the sweep operation and believes it

1 will be successful'. The CIA then clarifies that 'the army has yet to encounter
2 any major guerrilla force in the area', and goes on to conclude that the
3 army's 'successes to date appear to be limited to the destruction of several
4 "EGP-controlled-towns" and the killing of Indian collaborators and sympa-
5 thizers.' Point four concluded with 'COMMENT: The well documented belief
6 by the army that the entire Ixil Indian population is pro-EGP has created a
7 situation in which the army can be expected to give no quarter to combatants and
8 non-combatants alike.'³¹ In the words of former legal counsel to the CEH, Jan
9 Perlin, 'The historic attribution of particular characteristics to the "indigenous
10 masses", an integral part of the racist construct [of Guatemala], determined the
11 choice of military tactics against geographically defined portions of this group
12 when it was determined that "they" constituted a threat.'³²

13 Second, as explained in the previously cited October 1981 declassified US
14 Department of State memorandum, General Lucas Garcia believed that the
15 'extermination' was the measure of the 'success' of his 'policy of repression'.³³
16 Extermination was then not simply a means, but a goal. Moreover, despite their
17 convoluted language and censored presentation, these documents acknowledge
18 Guatemalan army massacres of unarmed Maya and also concur with the
19 Guatemalan army that all Ixiles are 'pro-EGP'. This concurrence between the
20 CIA, State Department, and Guatemalan army represents the official conflation
21 of ethnicity with political affiliation. Thus, the US Embassy and its officers in
22 Guatemala, the US State Department and the CIA justify Guatemalan army
23 destruction of the social, political and material culture of the Maya in general
24 and the Ixiles in particular. Though this justification for genocide is based on
25 the conflated idea that all Ixiles are pro-EGP, ethnicity is central to this equa-
26 tion. Moreover, the 1982 CIA document makes clear that the Army High
27 Command was not only informed about the massacres, but that the 'com-
28 manding officers of the units involved have been instructed to destroy all towns
29 and villages' and that the Army High Command was 'highly pleased with the
30 initial results'.³⁴

31 Thus far, I have demonstrated (1) that army massacres of Maya communities
32 violated Genocide Convention Articles 2(a), (b) and (c); (2) that though these
33 massacres were directed at Maya communities in the name of 'scorching com-
34 munist', in fact, the Guatemalan army carried out its first genocidal campaign
35 of massacres against the Maya because they were Maya; (3) further, that the
36 army sought to cover this campaign against the Maya by conflating political
37 affiliation with ethnic identity; (4) that because 'extermination' of the Maya
38 was, in the words of General Lucas Garcia, a measure of the campaign's 'success',
39 the genocide was both a means and an end goal; and, (5) based on declassified
40 CIA and US State Department documents, that the Army High Command
41 ordered, was informed about and 'highly pleased with' army massacres in
42 February 1982.

1 Proving intent to commit genocide

2
3 This brings us back to the issues of intent and standard of proof, which are
4 interrelated. First, intent is often confused with motive. In criminal law, intent
5 means the deliberation behind the act regardless of the actual motive.³⁵
6 Intentionality defines intent.³⁶ Did the Guatemalan army intend to commit
7 genocide against the Maya? Yes, because the army's commander in chief sought
8 to exterminate the Maya with no distinction between civilians and combatants
9 or between democratic opposition and armed insurrection.³⁷ Was the aim to
10 destroy the Maya, as a group, in whole or in part? Yes, because (1) all Maya were
11 at-risk of being 'exterminated' by virtue of their indigenous identity; (2) mas-
12 sacres destroyed 626 Maya villages; and, (3) all 626 villages were Maya.

13 By outlining the Guatemalan army's intent to commit genocide, I have also
14 alluded to available evidence that leads us to the issue of standard of proof.
15 Dinah Shelton suggests that '*beyond a reasonable doubt* in common law court
16 and *conviction in time* or its equivalent in a continental system' are interna-
17 tionally accepted standards of proof. Moreover, citing the Inter-American
18 Court judgment in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case, she is 'fully confident that
19 proof can be inferred from a pattern or practice'.³⁸

20 Ben Kiernan points out that 'Smoking Gun' internal documentation is not nec-
21 essary to prove intent – though the declassified US government documents do
22 provide this. Proof of intent can be inferred by 'a proven pattern of actions, not
23 just from a top-down written order'.³⁹ 'Serial killers who are convicted by show-
24 ing patterns and inferred responsibility from circumstantial evidence'⁴⁰ is one
25 such example. Kiernan adds that 'similar actions in a pattern across a territory can
26 be proof of command intent'.⁴¹

27 Declassified CIA and US State Department documents provide evidence of
28 intent to commit genocide. I would also like to suggest that intent is found in
29 the very language of the generals in command during the 'scorched earth
30 campaign'. While Lucas Garcia spoke of 'exterminating', General Efrain Rios
31 Montt spoke of 'taking the water away from the fish' (*quitar al agua del pes*), the
32 water being the Maya and the fish being the guerrilla. Even here, it is clear that
33 the general made a distinction between the guerrilla (fish) and the Maya
34 (water). If he truly meant to 'scorch communists' and 'eliminate subversion',
35 the fish, rather than the water, would have been his military target. If he was
36 unable to distinguish between the Maya and the guerrillas, the metaphor
37 would have had no meaning. Rios Montt, like Lucas Garcia before him, wanted
38 to eliminate the Maya. The massacres were a genocidal campaign, begun under
39 Lucas Garcia and continued under Rios Montt, which intended to destroy the
40 Maya because they were Maya. Seven months after Rios Montt came to power,
41 one Maya survivor said that after the massacres, 'All that was left was silence.'⁴²
42 Amnesty International issued a report condemning massacres of 'Indian' peasants

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552 *Genocide in Guatemala*

1 resulting in more than 2,600 documented deaths, 'many of them women and
 2 children', in the first six months of the Rios Montt regime. Even with incom-
 3 plete information, as early as 1982, it was clear to human rights observers that
 4 the Guatemalan 'Indians' were the target of the army's campaign of terror.⁴³
 5 Again, citing Perlin, 'The truth of genocidal intent centres around the process
 6 of the construction of the "other" as the enemy.'⁴⁴

7 At this point, I have demonstrated that the Guatemalan army committed
 8 genocide against the Maya with the intention to destroy the Maya in whole or
 9 in part and that genocide was both the means and the end, and furthermore,
 10 genocide was also the planned intent. Still, I want to offer further evidence of
 11 the army's strategic intent to commit genocide as well as some of the results of
 12 the genocidal campaign – both of which demonstrate that genocide was a con-
 13 sistent policy of the Guatemalan army through the dictatorships of Lucas
 14 Garcia and Rios Montt – each of whom had command responsibility.

16 **Genocide as army policy from Lucas Garcia to Rios Montt**

17 In general, the Guatemalan army has sought to elude responsibility for its
 18 genocidal campaign of massacres by claiming that massacres did not emanate
 19 from the army high command, but rather from the actions of rogue field com-
 20 manders. Still, one army colonel unequivocally stated that 'a comandante
 21 could not follow his own strategy against his superiors.'⁴⁵ Former General
 22 Efraín Rios Montt became president of Guatemala when he overthrew the dic-
 23 tatorship of Lucas Garcia in March 1982. La Violencia was at its height during
 24 these two dictatorships. Still, Rios Montt not only claims that he had nothing
 25 to do with the massacres, but that his regime stopped the massacres begun by
 26 Lucas Garcia.

27 General Lucas Garcia, withdrawn from the political scene for the past decade
 28 due to advanced Alzheimer's disease, died in May 2006. Rios Montt, however,
 29 continues to play a powerful role in Guatemalan politics. He is secretary gen-
 30 eral of the FRG party, which holds a significant number of seats in the
 31 Guatemalan Congress. Rios Montt has been a member of congress and presi-
 32 dent of the congress since the peace accords and his party has held the presi-
 33 dency as well. Indeed, Rios Montt attempted to run for president in 1995 and
 34 continues to manoeuvre for the office. In 1995, the Guatemalan Supreme
 35 Electoral Commission banned his candidacy (and his wife's) based on the
 36 Guatemalan Constitution, which prohibits anyone who came to power
 37 through a military coup from running for president. It took the FRG and Rios
 38 Montt until 2003 to stack the courts and win his right to a presidential bid. The
 39 symbol of his FRG party is a white hand on a blue background. When I asked
 40 Maya friends in rural communities about the meaning of this symbol, I was
 41 always told, 'It is the strong/tough hand' (*la mano dura*) and 'the white hand'
 42 (*la mano blanca*). Both *la mano dura* and *la mano blanca* were names of death

AQ3

Fruit

1 squads during La Violencia and death threats were often received with hand
2 prints or drawings of hands.

3 Though current party politics are not my focus here, I do want to suggest that
4 it is an ominous experience to be in a country of genocide survivors during an
5 election with *la mano dura* plastered on every building, fence and lamppost.
6 Outsiders, both non-Maya Guatemalans and internationals, often ask why and
7 how the FRG could win an election in communities of massacre survivors.
8 Though a thorough explanation requires analysis of evangelical church affilia-
9 tions with Rios Montt as well as campaign practices,⁴⁶ I want to suggest that
10 massacre survivors have no reason to believe that the power of Rios Montt to
11 exterminate their communities has diminished, given that he has an
12 omnipresent political party with propaganda throughout Maya communities
13 and that his party symbol is a signifier of terror.

14 In this section, through an analysis of the pattern of massacres in El Quiché
15 and Baja Verapaz during the last 12 months of Lucas Garcia's regime (March
16 1981–2) and the first 12 months of Rios Montt's reign (March 1982–3), I
17 demonstrate that (1) massacres were *not* the result of rogue field commanders;
18 (2) massacres were a systematic and strategic campaign of the army as an insti-
19 tution; (3) Rios Montt not only continued the campaign of massacres begun by
20 Lucas Garcia, he actually further systematized the massacre campaign; and (4)
21 this sustained campaign of massacres was the army's first genocidal campaign.


22 The Ixil and Ixcán areas are located in the northern part of El Quiché with
23 the Ixcán jungle north of the Ixil mountain range. Between March 1981 and
24 March 1983, the Guatemalan army carried out 77 massacres in the Ixil–Ixcán
25 region. There are 3,102 known victims of these massacres. If we locate the
26 number of massacres and victims by date on the calendar of the regimes, Lucas
27 Garcia is responsible for 45 massacres with 1,678 victims from March 1981 to
28 March 1982 and Rios Montt is responsible for 32 massacres with 1,424 victims
29 from March 1982 to March 1983 (See Chart 21.3).⁴⁷

30 If we focus only on comparing the number of massacres, we find a 15 per-
31 cent drop in the number of massacres and 200 less massacre victims in the
32 Ixil–Ixcán area during the first year of Rios Montt (See Chart 21.4). However, it
33 would be misleading to simply conclude that the number of massacres and
34 massacre victims decreased under Rios Montt because 1,424 Maya were killed
35 in 32 army massacres under his regime. Moreover, rather than a decrease in
36 genocidal activities in the area, the number of victims per massacre actually
37 increased under Rios Montt from an average of 37 victims to 45, or an 18 per-
38 cent increase in number of victims per massacre.

39 This increase indicates a more systematic genocidal policy which sought
40 'efficiency' in killing ever larger numbers of people in each massacre.
41 Furthermore, if we limit the time of study from the last three months under
42 Lucas Garcia and the first three months under Rios Montt, we find 775 Maya


AQ4

554 Genocide in Guatemala



Source: CEH 1999


Chart 21.3 Total number of massacre victims in northern EI Quiche March 1981 to March 1983



Source: CEH. *1983* **AQ5**

Chart 21.4 Number of massacres in northern EI Quiche

victims of 24 massacres under Lucas Garcia and 1,057 victims of 19 massacres under Rios Montt. Though there is a 21 percent drop in the number of known massacres, there is a 27 percent increase in the average number of victims in each massacre under Rios Montt. In the first three months of the Rios Montt regime, the average number of victims per massacre increased from 32 to 56



Source: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.5 Average number of victims per massacre in northern El Quiché

(See Chart 21.5). Further, the qualitative difference between an average of 32 and 56 victims is not the size of the village; rather it is the systematic inclusion of women, children and elderly in the slaughter. Whereas it is during the last six months of the Lucas García regime that the army began to include women, children and elderly as targets in some massacres, it is under Ríos Montt that their inclusion became a systematic practice.


If we broaden our analysis to the entire department of El Quiché, our conclusions about the strategies and patterns of massacres in the Ixil–Ixacán areas during the regimes of Lucas García and Ríos Montt are systematically reaffirmed.⁴⁸ Under Lucas García, from March 1981 to March 1982, 2,495 Maya were victims of 97 army massacres in the department of El Quiché. Under Ríos Montt, between March 1982 and March 1983, 3,180 Maya were victims of 85 massacres in El Quiché. Here again, while there is a 13 percent drop in the number of massacres under Ríos Montt, there is a 25 percent increase in the number of massacre victims during the first year of his regime (See Chart 21.6). Again, under Ríos Montt, there is an increase in the efficiency of the massacres with 30 percent more victims per massacre, on average. And again, I want to emphasize that this 30 percent increase represents the systematic inclusion of women, children and elderly as massacre victims.

Fully 43 percent of all the Achi Maya killed in army massacres between January of 1980 and December of 1982, died during the first nine months of the Ríos Montt regime (See Chart 21.7).⁴⁹ If we combine the massacres in the municipality of Rabinal and the departmental capital of Salama, we find the ladino-dominated Salama suffered 1 percent of massacres while the predominantly Achi-Maya Rabinal suffered 99 percent of the massacres (See Chart 21.8).

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556 Genocide in Guatemala


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Fuente: CEH, 1999

AQ6


Chart 21.6 El Quiche data



Fuente: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.7 Regime responsibility for percentage of massacre victims Baja Verapaz, 1980-1982 **AQ7**

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Fuente: CEH, *Page*

Chart 21.8 Percentage of massacre victims 1980-1983 by Municipality for Salama and Rabinal, Baja Verapaz **AQ8**

In 1981, 422 Rabinal Achi were killed by the army in massacres under Lucas Garcia – an average of 35 massacre victims per month. Another 95 Achi died in massacres during the last three months of the Lucas Garcia regime in 1982 – an average of 32 massacre victims per month. In just the first nine months of Rios Montt’s regime, 487 Rabinal Achi were killed in army massacres (See Chart 21.9). Averaging 54 massacre victims per month in Rabinal alone, there was a 64 percent increase in the number of massacre victims in Rabinal under Rios Montt.⁵⁰


Between 1980 and 1983, 25 percent of massacres were committed by the army alone. Another 21 percent were committed by army troops with judiciales – local ladinos from Salama and Rabinal vestido de civil con pañuelos rojos. Both Rabinal Achi and ladinos refer to these men interchangeably as ‘judiciales’ and ‘escuadrones’. Moreover, 54 percent of all Rabinal massacres were committed by the army with PAC military commissioners and/or patrollers. Under the regime of Rios Montt, military commissioners and PACs were included in every army massacre in Rabinal.⁵¹

Genocide is a gendered atrocity because its intention is to destroy the cultural group. This means destruction of the community’s material culture as well as its reproductive capacity – thus, women and children are prime genocidal targets. One way to pinpoint the height of the genocide is to look at the ratio of male to female massacre victims. In 1981, females (including women and girls) comprised

AQ9 dressed as civilians w/ red in Salma


558 Genocide in Guatemala

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Source: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.9 Number of massacre victims – Rabinal, Baja Verpaz 1980–1982



Fuente: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.10 Percentage of massacre victims by gender Baja Verapaz, 1980–1983

14 percent of massacre victims in Rabinal. By 1982, they made up 42 percent of massacre victims. By charting the gender composition of massacre victims over time, we see that halfway through 1982 the increase in the number of women killed in massacres rises so rapidly that the comparative percentage of men killed actually drops (See Chart 21.10).

1 This point of intersection represents the successful implementation of a shift
2 in army strategy from selective massacres to genocide and is located midway
3 through 1982 about three months after Rios Montt seized power.⁵²

4 No doubt, the ever-increasing number of Maya massacre victims and the pat-
5 tern from the Lucas Garcia regime to the rule of Rios Montt indicates an ongo-
6 ing army strategy that was consistent in its target population (the Maya) and
7 one which became increasingly efficient. Moreover, this improved efficiency
8 was no accident and certainly not the random and coincidental outcome of
9 rogue commanders in the field. It was the field implementation of the
10 Guatemalan army's 'Plan de Campana Victoria 82' (Victory Campaign Plan 82)
11 which sought to 'eliminate', 'annihilate' and 'exterminate' the 'enemy'.⁵³


12 In her extensive study of the Guatemalan military based on interviews with
13 high-ranking officers, Jennifer Schirmer concluded: 'The concentration of ener-
14 gies and forces [of Plan Victoria] resulted in the most closely coordinated,
15 intensive massacre campaign in Guatemalan history.'⁵⁴ General Hector
16 Gramajo, Rios Montt's Deputy Chief of Staff, told Schirmer 'proudly' that 'one
17 of the first things we did was draw up a document for the campaign with
18 annexes and appendices. It was a complete job with planning down to the last
19 detail.'⁵⁵ Gramajo also told Schirmer that he was 'coordinator and supervisor of
20 the military commanders of operations for the western zone (Alta and Baja
21 Verapaces, El Quiché, Huerhuetenango and Chimaltenango)'; he also referred
22 to the campaign of massacres as his 'baby'.⁵⁶ Less than one month after the
23 Rios Montt coup, Plan Victoria was signed by the junta on 10 April 1982 and
24 officially began 10 days later. Throughout the campaign, Gramajo and the
25 army General Staff received hourly and daily intelligence reports about all the
26 details of the campaign via radio transmissions.⁵⁷ A critical component of Plan
27 Victoria was the systematic organization of civil patrols that was begun, per-
28 haps as a pilot campaign, under Lucas Garcia but brought to fruition under Rios
29 Montt. Fully 64 percent of army massacres during the 34-year conflict occurred
30 between June 1981 and December 1982.⁵⁸ According to a statistical analysis of
31 the CEH findings, 14.5 percent of Ixil Maya and 16 percent of Achi Maya were
32 killed during La Violencia.⁵⁹

34 **Inclusion of PACs in Guatemalan army massacres**

35
36 Given that PACs were an integral component of the 1982 Victory Campaign, I
37 want to again look at the massacres, but this time analyzing the composition
38 of the perpetrators. My questions here are (1) Who carried out the massacres?
39 (2) Does this reveal a pattern? (3) If there is a pattern, what are its implications?

40 In the department of El Quiché during the last year of the Lucas Garcia
41 regime, army platoons carried out 97 massacres but 16 of these massacres were
42 different from the rest because, for the first time, army platoons carried out
massacres with local PAC participation under army command.⁶⁰ Under Lucas

560 Genocide in Guatemala



Fuente: CEH. (9)

Chart 21.11 Command responsibility of army and PACS during the last 12 months of Lucas Garica Regime **AQ10**

Garcia, 19 percent of massacres were carried out by army platoons with PAC participation (under army command) and 81 percent of massacres were carried out by army platoons alone. Reviewing the number of victims of each massacre, one finds that 87 percent of the victims were killed in army platoon massacres and 13 percent of the victims were killed in joint army/PAC massacres (See Chart 21.11).

Each massacre was representative of a wide-scale military strategy that did not distinguish between civilians and combatants;⁶¹ a strategy that first used terror and psychological cruelty to force communities to accede to army control. Massacres should not be seen as discrete and one-time-only incidents of state violence but rather as integral strategic operations which in their sum form the army's first genocide campaign. Nonetheless, each massacre is still significant in that it embodies the moment in which violence explodes into the lives of civilian villagers and forever changes the lives of citizens in Guatemalan society both locally and nationally. It is within the tension of this local and comparative national analysis of the massacres that we can best understand the meaning of the Guatemalan genocide.

In the Ixil Area, in the last six months of 1980, 83 Maya lost their lives in army massacres in five Ixil communities. By 1981, PACs were systematically incorporated into the army's massacre campaign. Indeed, of 79 army massacres


1 carried out by the army in El Quiché during 1981, local PACs participated in 12
2 of these massacres (or 15 percent).⁶² By 1982, the army had committed 131
3 massacres in El Quiché and local PACs participated in 41 of these massacres –
4 doubling PAC participation in army massacres to 31 percent.⁶³ No doubt, this
5 increase in PAC execution of army strategy represents both the expansion of
6 the army's scorched earth campaign as well as the growth of army-controlled
7 civil patrols throughout the region.

8 In its comprehensive investigation, the CEH found that 18 percent of human
9 rights violations were committed by civil patrols. Further, it noted that 85 per-
10 cent of those violations committed by patrollers were carried out under army
11 order.⁶⁴ It is not insignificant that the CEH found that one out of every ten
12 human rights violations was carried out by a military commissioner and that
13 while these commissioners often led patrollers in acts of violence, 87 percent of
14 the violations committed by commissioners were in collusion with the army.⁶⁵

15 Less than one month after the army organized all the men of San José and San
16 Antonio Sinaché, Zacualpa, into a PAC, army-ordered PAC violence began
17 within the community. On 24 May 1982 (exactly two months after the coup),
18 the army called all the 800 patrollers to gather in front of the church in San
19 Antonio Sinaché. After chastising them for failing to turn in any guerrillas in the
20 preceding weeks, the army lieutenant sent them on a fruitless march through
21 the mountains searching for guerrillas. When they returned empty-handed, the
22 army and patrollers who had remained showed them the dead bodies of four
23 PAC members and two local women. After ordering the patrollers to relinquish
24 their palos (sticks) and machetes, the lieutenant accused Manuel Tol Canil, one
25 of the local PAC chiefs of being a guerrilla. Two other patrollers protested that
26 Canil was not a guerrilla and had committed no crime. The lieutenant then
27 accused those two patrollers of also being guerrillas.⁶⁶

28 The hands of the three men were bound behind their backs and they were
29 tied to a tree in front of the church. The lieutenant ordered the patrollers to
30 form a line in front of the tree. He picked up one of the machetes, gave it to
31 the first man in line, and ordered him to 'Vos matalo a éste. Si vos no lo matás,
32 te mato a vos.' Taking turns, the men were ordered not to hit the men with
33 lethal blows because their deaths should be slow to extend their suffering.
34 When the first victim died after three machete blows, the lieutenant said,
35 'That's too bad that he couldn't tolerate more, he died with only three blows
36 of the machete.'⁶⁷ After all three men had been killed, the patrollers were
37 ordered to bury them. One patroller recalled returning home after killings, 'We
38 came home cold, we were all frightened. The elders were crying as we walked
39 down the path. The thing is that we were all crying.'⁶⁸ Another former patroller
40 explained the impact of this army-ordered violence in his community, 'We
41 began to drink more *guaro* [grain alcohol] to make our hearts more tranquil to
42 try to pass through the pain these events brought to us.'⁶⁹

AQ11

562 *Genocide in Guatemala*

Fuente: CEH, 1999

Chart 21.12 Command responsibility of army and PAC under Rios Montt Regime

Plan Victoria, developed under Rios Montt, increased the centrality of the PACs to army strategy.⁷⁰ Less than one month after Rios Montt's coup, the army began an intensified and systematic forced recruitment of Maya into the PACs.⁷¹ This further systematized the inclusion of civil patrols in the counterinsurgency begun under Lucas Garcia. Thus, it should not be surprising that army massacres with PAC participation more than doubled to account for 41 percent of army massacres under Rios Montt and that the number of victims of army/PAC massacres more than tripled to account for 47 percent of army massacre victims (See Chart 21.12).

This systematic pattern of incorporation of army-controlled civil patrols participating in army massacres at the same time that the army's official Plan Victoria campaign calls for increased organization of these PACs indicates 'beyond a shadow of a doubt' that (1) massacres were carried out by army platoons and army platoons with PAC participation; (2) the pattern of army and army/PAC massacres from Lucas Garcia to Rios Montt indicates massacres as a result of widespread army strategy and command responsibility; (3) this pattern further reveals a highly coordinated army campaign which increasingly and systematically included PACs in massacre operations under army command; (4) this pattern could only have existed as the result of a widespread army strategy with incorporation of PACs as a strategic component of the 1982 Plan Victoria; and (5) both Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt, as well as Gramajo and

1 other army officials in the High Command, had command responsibility and
2 were the intellectual authors of army and army/PAC massacres of the Maya
3 during their military regimes. This sustained campaign of massacres was the
4 army's first genocidal campaign against the Maya.
5

6 **'Hunter Battalions' – the Guatemalan army's second campaign** 7 **of genocide** 8

9 As the Guatemalan army moved forward with Plan Victoria's first campaign of
10 genocide committing massacres against the Maya in villages throughout the
11 country, those who survived by fleeing into the mountains were pursued by
12 the army. Initially, massacre survivors fled to nearby villages in the mountains
13 seeking refuge from the army ground troops chasing them through the moun-
14 tains as well as the machine gun strafing of army helicopters and the bombs
15 being dropped from planes. These villages were soon attacked and destroyed by
16 the army, which left only the mountain itself as refuge.

17 In July 1981, based on an interview with an unnamed US intelligence oper-
18 ative who had worked in Brazil and Colombia, Everett G. Martin reported in
19 the *Wall Street Journal* that 'the Carter Administration's policy of turning its
20 back on a country that violates the human rights of its citizens during the fight
21 against guerrillas "is a coward's way out."' Martin also reported on the indoctrina-
22 tion of Salvadoran troops at a special training school. An unnamed Green
23 Beret colonel explained the counterinsurgency techniques: 'There aren't any
24 such things as special forces camps or free-fire zones in irregular warfare. We are
25 supposed to train the local forces to play guerrilla with hunter battalions that
26 are moving all the time. ... You make them realize their situation is hopeless
27 and then you offer them amnesty.'⁷² These same techniques were taught to
28 Guatemalan army officials and troops at the School of the Americas.⁷³

29 Indeed, former soldiers involved in the pursuit of civilians in flight have
30 referred to these operations as 'hunting the deer' (*cazando el venado*). The tech-
31 nique was to use multiple platoons to encircle a large area. These troops would
32 be backed up by helicopter strafing and aerial bombardment. Soldiers would
33 begin to fire into the forested areas of the mountains on all but one side of the
34 circle thereby forcing the civilians to flee in the direction which appeared to be
35 safe for lack of gunfire. As civilians reached these areas, the soldiers would open
36 fire directly onto the civilian populations. This sustained 'hunt' of the Maya
37 and the intentional suffering and destruction it caused is the army's second
38 campaign of genocide against the Maya.

39 While the army killed civilians in flight, they also forced these internal refugees
40 to die from hunger. Empty villages were burned and their crops were destroyed by
41 the army. Even those villagers who had dug *buzones* to hide and store corn and
42 clothing had fared little better than those who had not. The *buzones* were

1 most often found and destroyed or looted by the army and/or civil patrols.
2 Civilians in flight had little more than the clothes on their back and whatever
3 food they were able to carry lasted, at best, for only a few days. Civilians fled
4 the army sometimes for days and sometimes for a week until they found a tem-
5 porary safe haven where they would stay until the next army attack or until
6 they drifted away in search of food and water. Wherever they landed, they were
7 constantly pursued by hunger and thirst.

8 Writing of survival in Auschwitz, Primo Levi wrote: 'the physiological
9 reserves of the organism were consumed in two or three months, and death
10 by hunger, or by diseases induced by hunger, was the prisoner's normal des-
11 tiny, avoidable only with additional food.'⁷⁴ Indeed, in the hundreds of testi-
12 monies I have taken from massacre survivors, the power of the hunger, thirst
13 and illness of life in flight from army troops overwhelms even the event of the
14 massacre because life in flight went on for years and during the years in flight
15 an average of 30 percent of massacre survivors died from army attacks, hunger
16 and illnesses associated with hunger and exposure to the elements.⁷⁵ It was the
17 desperation of hunger that drove massacre survivors to forage for edible roots,
18 weeds and bark in the mountains and also to search for any abandoned crops
19 of milpa missed by the army's scorched earth campaign. Don Silverio recalls,
20 'It had been more than eight days without food. We were far in the mountain,
21 but we could see the milpa. The soldiers had left. There was a youth who was
22 very brave, he said he was going to investigate and bring back maize for all of
23 us. We heard the explosion. Poor youth. The army had mined the milpa.
24 In other places where we found milpa, the soldiers had shit on our sacred
25 milpa.'⁷⁶

26 'Thirst', wrote Levi, 'does not give respite. Hunger exhausts, thirst enrages.'⁷⁷
27 When not cold and wet from the constant rain of winter, massacre survivors in
28 flight were hot and in search of water in the unrelenting heat of summer.
29 Without water, there can be no life. What kind of life is there when water is so
30 limited that one does not know from one day to the next if there will be water
31 enough to drink? What does it mean to bring new life into the world in such
32 dire conditions? Doña Juanita gave birth in the mountains when there was no
33 water: 'My son was born in the mountain. He was born without clothes. He was
34 born without food. We didn't even have any water. When my son was born,
35 I couldn't even change because I had no other clothes and I had to stay in my
36 own filth because there was no water. We suffered greatly in the mountain.'⁷⁸
37 Even when there was enough water for bathing, there was never any soap. In
38 place of soap, people used ashes when they bathed.

39 Just as massacres were not the result of rogue army commanders, the hunt for
40 Maya civilians in flight in the mountains as well as all the resulting death, pri-
41 vations and sufferings were the systematic enactment of the Guatemalan army's
42 second campaign of genocide against the Maya. The goal of this campaign,

1 which was supported by the US government, was to eliminate those Maya who
2 survived the hundreds of army massacres.

3
4 **Forced concentration of massacre survivors into army-controlled**
5 **'model villages'**
6

7 The third army campaign of genocide is the forced concentration of Maya
8 massacre survivors into army-controlled camps which the army called 'model
9 villages'. In *Survival in Auschwitz*, Primo Levi writes of his arrival to the camp:
10 'we saw a large door, and above it a sign, brightly illuminated (its memory
11 still strikes me in my dreams): Work Gives Freedom.'⁷⁹ In keeping with the
12 Nazi fantasy of work and freedom in concentration camps, the Guatemalan
13 Army named roads within its model villages 'Avenue of Development',
14 'Avenue of Security',⁸⁰ 'National Army Avenue' and 'Road of the Fallen',⁸¹
15 and signposts at the entries had slogans such as: 'Guatemala is peace and
16 development',⁸² 'Welcome to Saraxoch, a totally ideologically new community',
17 'Anti-Subversive Village. Ideologically New'⁸³ and 'Only he who fights has the
18 right to win. Only he who wins has the right to live.'⁸⁴

19 In September of 1982, *New York Times* reporter Marlise Simons reported that
20 Rios Montt was carrying out a 'methodical counterinsurgency program'
21 begun when Rios Montt imposed a state of siege in July and which included
22 military operations of 25,000 army soldiers 'aided by some 25,000 members
23 of a newly created Civil Defense Force' Further, she wrote that the
24 'government's new strategy ... includes herding thousands of Indian villagers
25 into army-controlled zones.' Simon visited displaced survivors of the army
26 massacre of Las Pacayas village; she wrote: 'Since the massacre, the army has
27 returned 150 villagers to Las Pacayas, where they now live in rows of military
28 tents and improvised huts. In the presence of an army captain, the Indian
29 men repeated the official version that the "subversives" had attacked them.'
30 Outside the surveillance of the army, several sources confirmed the massacre
31 was committed by the army.⁸⁵

32 Model villages such as Las Pacayas were an integral part of the Army's 'Poles of
33 Development' campaign which theoretically provided for rural development. In
34 reality, the model villages, like the poles of development, were army-controlled
35 resettlement work camps developed as a means of maintaining absolute control
36 over communities of displaced Maya massacre survivors. The construction of
37 the model villages was among the first 'food for work' projects which returning
38 massacre survivors were forced to build. Most of these villages were built upon
39 the burned remains of villages razed by the army. Indeed, massacre survivors
40 often returned to their villages of origin to rebuild under army order. Because
41 the composition of villages was determined by the army, many villages were
42 rebuilt with Maya from different villages as well as other ethnolinguistic

1 communities. Thus, many Maya today describe their communities as *revuelto*
 2 [scrambled]. In addition to the villages, survivors were also forced to build access
 3 roads for army vehicles.

4 Just as hunger had driven massacre survivors to surrender from the moun-
 5 tains, hunger also drove them to work for food. 'No work projects, no food.
 6 A great way of doing things', said Sergeant Corsantes, one of the commanders
 7 at the Saraxoch model village.⁸⁶ Indeed, the 1980 Santa Fe Committee's 'A New
 8 Inter-American Policy for the 80s' which served as a blueprint for the Reagan
 9 administration's Latin American policies, cynically stated 'Food is a weapon in
 10 a world at war.'⁸⁷ The Guatemalan army journal *Revista Militar* noted, 'In twenty
 11 four hours, it is possible to assemble 3,000 or more voluntary workers to under-
 12 take construction of a road, a school, irrigation projects, a whole city ...'⁸⁸

13 Within the model villages, residents were called to line-up in formation and
 14 register in the morning, the afternoon, and the evening. Each day at midday,
 15 residents were also required to participate in anti-guerrilla, pro-army confes-
 16 sional rituals in which several local men would recount how they had been
 17 betrayed by the guerrilla and helped by the army. Residents were not allowed
 18 to leave model villages without army permission.⁸⁹

19 The construction of model villages was reminiscent of the strategic hamlets
 20 developed in Vietnam by the United States and the South Vietnamese army
 21 during the Vietnam War. Model villages included at least one, and often two,
 22 military detachments of 150 soldiers who were permanently housed in army
 23 garrisons built within the village. These garrisons were most often located close
 24 to the village entrance allowing soldiers to monitor daily activities within the
 25 village. Model villages each had army/PAC patrol posts at the entrance and exit
 26 of the village. A soldier in the model village of Chisec explained, 'We have a list
 27 of names. If their names appear on the list, we take them.' Responding to a
 28 question about the fate of those taken away, the soldier said, 'They die.'⁹⁰ Thus,
 29 the grid-pattern construction plan of model village housing and its garrison
 30 layout, and land distribution was designed for army surveillance and control of
 31 the population, not for the functional development of productive agrarian
 32 communities as the army claimed in 'Poles of Development' propaganda. The
 33 model village plan destroyed the traditional village layout of scattered housing,
 34 a layout that allowed for cultivation of crops and care of livestock, replacing it
 35 with rows of tightly packed housing placed in an urban grid pattern, thus
 36 destroying agrarian production.

37 38 **Genocide, terror and the sacred milpa**

39
40 In his theorizing on cultures of terror, Michael Taussig wrote that the cultural
 41 elaboration of fear was integral to controlling massive populations.⁹¹ The loss
 42 and destruction of milpa is present in every testimony not simply because it is

1 the principle food source of the Maya, but because maize is sacred. Nobel Prize
2 winning Guatemalan writer Miguel Angel Asturias wrote: 'The maize
3 impoverishes the earth and makes no one rich. Neither the boss, nor the men.
4 Sown to be eaten it is the sacred sustenance of the men who were made of
5 maize. Sown to make money it means famine for the men who were made of
6 maize.'⁹² The Maya are the 'Men of Maize' and Maya origin stories begin with
7 the birth of the Maya through maize.⁹³ Thus, Guatemalan army destruction of
8 maize was a recurring ritual destruction of the Maya both physically and
9 spiritually. This ritual destruction has new meaning under genocide law fol-
10 lowing the decisions of International Criminal Tribunal for the former
11 Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its Rule 61 decision which identified three new (and more
12 expansive) categories for consideration in the interpretation of the intent
13 requirement for genocide: '(1) the general political doctrine of the aggressor;
14 (2) the repetition of discriminatory and destructive acts; and (3) the perpetra-
15 tion of acts which violate or are perceived by the aggressor as violating the
16 foundations of the group, whether or not they constitute the enumerated acts
17 prohibited in the genocide definition, and so long as they are part of the same
18 pattern of conduct.'⁹⁴

19 As Perlin points out in her insightful work, the third category allows for the
20 consideration of violations historically considered to be 'cultural genocide',
21 violations previously excluded from legal consideration under the definition of
22 genocide which was limited under the genocide convention to 'the construct
23 of physical or mental destruction'.⁹⁵ Thus, in the CEH's analysis, acts of cultural
24 destruction were considered to be 'signposts of the subjective intent of the
25 attackers when they were committed together with the acts of physical destruc-
26 tion specifically proscribed in the Genocide Convention'. In the ICTY's broad-
27 ened categories of intent, 'the bombing of sacred Maya lands used for religious
28 worship ... the burning of huipiles ... the prohibition of ritual burial of the
29 dead', and the destruction of other ritual icons 'were indicative of an intent to
30 destroy the group, as such'. Perlin specifically notes that the 'religious and cul-
31 tural significance that the Maya attribute to the cultivation of the land, and
32 particularly of maize' was central to the CEH's conclusion that the army com-
33 mitted acts of genocide.⁹⁶

34 For massacre survivors, the sacred milpa was prominent not only in testi-
35 monies of community loss and destruction, but also a potent symbol of com-
36 munity regeneration. The endurance and reinvention of ritual belief systems is
37 an indication of their ongoing social and cultural significance. In the case of
38 the Maya survivors, this significance is found not only in what was lost to the
39 violence but also in what has been reconstructed in its aftermath. Just as the
40 destruction and desecration of the milpa became a metaphor for army viola-
41 tion of the integrity of Maya communities, the resurrection of the milpa is a
42 living metaphor of community rebirth.

1 Don Justicio, an Ixil community leader recounted the suffering and rebirth
2 of his community through a story of the milpa:

3
4 In the time of the violence, a moment arrived in which the sacred milpa,
5 which gives us life, disappeared. From so much destruction of its very roots,
6 it disappeared. Because the maize disappeared, there was a time in which
7 the people had to live without maize. This was a time when many people
8 died, many children died, because the sacred maize had been exterminated.
9 But there was an elderly man who had a buzón and even though he had to
10 displace himself many times fleeing the army, his buzón remained
11 untouched. The sacred maize in his buzón was untouched. A moment
12 arrived when he was able to return to his buzón to see what was there, to
13 see if anything remained. He found a little bit of maize. And though he was
14 hungry, he didn't eat this little bit of maize. No, he carried it back to the
15 communities and handful by handful, he gave it to his friends, neighbours,
16 and compañeros. Everyone had just a little bit because there wasn't very
17 much. This was how we once again began to cultivate the sacred maize.
18 After it was planted, we had our first harvest and once again we were able
19 to make tortillas. After so many deaths, so much sadness, we were still able
20 to cultivate our sacred milpa.⁹⁷

21 22 **Justice after genocide?**

23
24 On 29 April 2004, the Inter-American Court issued its condemnation of the
25 Guatemalan government for the 18 July 1982 massacre of 188 Achi-Maya in
26 the village of Plan de Sánchez in the mountains above Rabinal, Baja Verapaz.
27 The Inter-American Court attributed the massacre to Guatemalan Army troops.
28 This is the first ruling by the Inter-American Court against the Guatemalan
29 state for any of the 626 massacres carried out by the army in the early 1980s.
30 The Court later announced the damages the Guatemalan state will be required
31 to pay to the relatives of victims at \$7.9 million.⁹⁸

32 Beyond the importance of this judgment for the people of Plan de Sánchez,
33 the Court's ruling is particularly significant because the following key points
34 were included in the judgment: (1) there was a genocide in Guatemala;
35 (2) this genocide was part of the framework of the internal armed conflict
36 when the armed forces of the Guatemalan government applied their National
37 Security Doctrine in its counterinsurgency actions; and (3) these counterinsur-
38 gency actions carried out within the Guatemalan government's National
39 Security Doctrine took place during the regime of General Efraín Ríos Montt
40 who came to power through military coup in March of 1982.

41 Further, regarding the massacre in Plan de Sánchez, the Court indicated that
42 the armed forces of the Guatemalan government had violated the following

1 rights, each of which is consecrated in the Human Rights Convention of the
2 Organization of American States: (1) the right to personal integrity; (2) the
3 right to judicial protection; (3) the right to judicial guarantees of equality
4 before the law; (4) the right to freedom of conscience; (5) the right to freedom
5 of religion; and (6) the right to private property.⁹⁹

6 The Plan de Sánchez case was considered by the Inter-American Court at the
7 request of the Inter-American Commission which had received a petition from
8 surviving relatives of the massacre victims. These survivors requested consider-
9 ation within the Inter-American Court because of the lack of justice in the
10 Guatemalan legal system. Since the Plan de Sánchez case was initiated in 1995,
11 the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) has carried out
12 more than 300 exhumations of clandestine cemeteries of massacre victims in
13 Guatemala. Each of these exhumations has included the filing of a criminal
14 case with forensic evidence against the Guatemalan army and its agents. To
15 date, only the Rio Negro case has been heard in a Guatemalan court and no
16 army officials were included in the case which found three civil patrollers
17 guilty.¹⁰⁰ Survivors continue to seek justice in local, national, regional and
18 international courts.

19 In July 2006, the Spanish Court issued an international arrest order charging
20 various former generals and military officials with genocide, terrorism, torture,
21 assassination and illegal detention. Those charged include: General Efraín Ríos
22 Montt (head of state through military coup from March 1982 to August 1983);
23 General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores (head of state through military coup
24 from August 1983 to January 1986); General Fernando Romeo Lucas García
25 (president of Guatemala from 1978 to March 1982); General Ángel Aníbal
26 Guevara Rodríguez (Minister of Defence under Lucas García); Donald Álvarez
27 Ruiz (Minister of Interior under Lucas García); Colonel German Chupina
28 Barahona (Director of the National Police under Lucas García); Pedro García
29 Arredondo (Chief of Command 6 of the National Police under Lucas García);
30 and General Benedito Lucas García (Army chief of staff during his brother's
31 reign).¹⁰¹ As of March 2007, none of these military officers have been extra-
32 dited and each has filed numerous appeals to slow the process.¹⁰² Moreover,
33 they continue to make public justifications and/or deny any knowledge of
34 human rights violations. While none of them have been jailed, the country of
35 Guatemala is now their jail because INTERPOL agreements bind any country
36 receiving a visitor on INTERPOL's international arrest order list as being im-
37 mediately extraditable. Still, they continue to argue that self-granted amnesties
38 give them immunity from prosecution as they live with impunity in
39 Guatemala.

40 Moreover, the evidence suggests that we can and should make connections
41 between practices and discourses of violence in the past and present. In the his-
42 toriography of Guatemala, there is a particular lexicon that we can trace from

1 the 1980s (and probably earlier). In the 1980s, the military regimes: blamed the
 2 victims by calling them subversives; threatened anyone who opposed the
 3 repression; claimed amnesty for any crimes committed by the army; blamed
 4 the guerrilla for any killings or disappearances; and pleaded ignorance to the
 5 violence engulfing the country. In the 1990s, the army: blamed the massacre
 6 victims for causing the massacres; claimed the victims and survivors were sub-
 7 versives; threatened anyone who sought exhumations; claimed amnesty for
 8 any crimes committed; blamed the guerrilla for all violence; and pleaded igno-
 9 rance for obvious army violence. After the Spanish Court issued its arrest war-
 10 rant, the generals: claimed the Spanish judge was an ETA terrorist; threatened
 11 witnesses; claimed amnesty for any crimes committed; blamed the guerrillas
 12 for massacres; and pleaded ignorance. In the contemporary cases of *feminicidio*
 13 (the killing of women), extrajudicial executions and social cleansing, the jus-
 14 tice system in general and the prosecutor's office in particular have: dismissed
 15 the victims as less than worthy by calling them gang-members; blamed gangs
 16 for all the violence; claimed social cleansing does not exist; claim witnesses will
 17 not come forward; and, continue to plead ignorance about all aspects of vio-
 18 lence even though there are more murders per day now than there were in the
 19 late 1980s.¹⁰³ It is impunity – the violation of the law by those charged with
 20 upholding it – that connects the genocide of the past with the violence of the
 21 present. Keeping those connections clear and dissecting institutional responsi-
 22 bility for violence remain the tasks confronting contemporary and future
 23 scholarship on Guatemala.

24 25 Notes

- 26
- 27 1. This chapter draws on *Violencia y Genocidio en Guatemala* (Guatemala City: F&G
 - 28 Editores, 2003) and *Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala* (New York:
 - 29 Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Special thanks to Dan Stone for his patience and for
 - 30 including my work on Guatemala in this volume, to Raul Figueroa Sarti for his
 - 31 unconditional love and support, and to Valentina for teaching me that I could
 - 32 write and be a mother at the same time. This chapter is dedicated to the survivors
 - 33 of the Guatemalan genocide. Any errors are mine.
 - 34 2. All names of massacre survivors are pseudonyms.
 - 35 3. URNG: Union Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca – Guatemalan National
 - 36 Revolutionary Union.
 - 37 4. See Amnesty International (hereafter AI), *Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial*
 - 38 *Executions in Rural Areas Under the Government of Efraín Ríos Montt*. Special Briefing
 - 39 (New York: AI, 1982); AI, *Guatemala: Lack of Investigations into Past Human Rights*
 - 40 *Abuses: Clandestine Cemeteries* (London: AI, 1991); AI, *Human Rights Violations*
 - 41 *Against Indigenous Peoples of the Americas* (New York: AI, 1992); AI, *Guatemala: All*
 - 42 *the Truth, Justice for All* (New York: AI, 1998); Americas Watch (hereafter AW),
 - Little Hope: Human Rights in Guatemala, January 1984 to January 1985* (New York:
 - AW, 1985); AW, *Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners* (New York: AW, 1984);
 - R. Carmack, *Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis*

- 1 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); R. Falla, *Masacres de la Selva*
 2 (Guatemala City: Editorial Universitario, 1992); Fundación de Antropología
 3 Forense de Guatemala (Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation – FAFG),
 4 *Las Masacres de Rabinal* (Guatemala City: FAFG, 1995); FAFG Exhumation Reports
 5 1992 to 1998 on file in FAFG office; Oficina de Derechos Humanos del
 6 Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHA), *Guatemala- Nunca Más*, Vols. 1–4; Informe
 7 Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperaación de la Memoria Histórica (REHMI)
 8 (Guatemala City: ODHA, 1998); S. Davis and J. Hodson, *Witness to Political*
 9 *Violence in Guatemala*. Impact Audit 2 (Boston, MA: Oxfam America, 1982);
 10 B. Manz, *Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala*
 11 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988); C. Figueroa Ibarra, *El*
 12 *Recurso del Miedo – Ensayo sobre el Estado y el Terror en Guatemala* (San Jose, Costa
 13 Rica: EDUCA, 1991).
- 14 5. W. Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492*
 15 *to the Present* (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1997).
 - 16 6. Falla, *Masacres de la Selva*.
 - 17 7. For an excellent analysis of urban political movements, see D. Levenson-Estrada,
 18 *Trade Unionists Against Terror: Guatemala City 1954–1985* (Chapel Hill, NC:
 19 University of North Carolina Press, 1994); S. Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels,*
 20 *Death Squads and US Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); J. Fried, ed.
 21 *Guatemala in Rebellion: An Unfinished History* (New York: Grove Press, 1983); and
 22 E. Galeano, *Pais Ocupado* (Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1967). For a comparative analy-
 23 sis of Latin American movements, see A. Escobar and S. Alvarez, eds, *The Making of*
 24 *Social Movements in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). For more on
 25 urban state terror in Guatemala, see A. Peralta, *Dialectica del Terror* and Figueroa
 26 Ibarra, *El Recurso del Miedo*. See also J. Corradi, ed., *Fear at the Edge: State Terrorism*
 27 *in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). For an eloquent fictional por-
 28 trayal of urban life during La Violencia, see A. Arias, *After the Bombs* (Willimantic,
 29 CT: Curbstone Press, 1990).
 - 30 8. T. Barry, *Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Albuquerque, NM: Inter-
 31 Hemispheric Education Center, 1986), p. 36. For excellent maps of military bases in
 32 Guatemala, see also CEH, *Memoria*, vol. II, 524–5.
 - 33 9. See V. Sanford, 'The Moral Imagination of Survival: Displacement and Child
 34 Soldiers in Colombia and Guatemala', in *Troublemakers of Peacemakers? Youth and*
 35 *Post-Accord Peacebuilding*, ed., S. McEvoy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
 36 Dame Press, 2006).
 - 37 10. J. Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy*
 38 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 47.
 - 39 11. Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), *Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio*,
 40 12 vols. (Guatemala City: CEH, 1999), Vol. 7, p. 53.
 - 41 12. CEH, Vol. 7, p. 10. While the CEH provided comprehensive documentation of
 42 Guatemalan army human rights violations throughout the country, international
 and national human rights groups had been reporting these violations for years.
 See, for example, AW, *Closing Space: Human Rights in Guatemala* (New York: AW,
 1988) and *Clandestine Detention in Guatemala* (New York: AW, 1993); AI,
 'Guatemala: A Government Program of Political Murder', *New York Review of Books*,
 19 March 1981, 38–40; AI, *Guatemala: The Human Rights Record* (London: AI, 1987);
 Davis and Hodson, *Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala*; R. Falla, ed., *Voices of*
the Survivors: The Massacre at Finca San Francisco (Cambridge: Cultural Survival and
 Anthropology Resource Center Report No. 10, 1983). See also A. Arias 'Changing

572 *Genocide in Guatemala*

- 1 Indian Identity: Guatemala's Violent Transition to Modernity', in *Guatemalan*
2 *Indians and the State*, ed., C. Smith (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990),
3 pp. 230–57; M. Diskin, *Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the United States*
4 *in the 1980s* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983).
- 5 13. Specifically violated were Articles 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 17.2 and 20.1 of the UDHR; Articles
6 6, 7 and 9 of the ICPR; and, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention against Torture.
- 7 14. Convention Against Torture, Article 2.1.
- 8 15. Guatemala became a signatory to the UDHR in 1948, the same year it was adopted
9 by the UN. The Genocide Convention was adopted by the UN in 1948 and has
10 been in effect since 1951. Guatemala approved signing the Genocide Convention
11 in Decree 704 on 11 November 1949 and became an official signatory on 1 June
12 1950. The ICPR was adopted by the UN in 1966 and has been in effect since 1976;
13 adopted by the UN in 1984, the Convention against Torture has been in effect since
14 that same year. While Guatemala did not sign the ICPR until 1992 and the
15 Convention against Torture until 1990, each of these conventions has been
16 adopted and come into force with a majority of state signatories. When a majority
17 of states agree to an international convention or protocol, it can be argued that this
18 majority commitment represents a new standard of international customary law to
19 which all states can be held accountable.
- 20 16. Specifically violated were Articles 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 17.2 and 20.1 of the Universal
21 Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the International
22 Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICPR); and, Articles 1 and 2 of the
23 Convention against Torture.
- 24 17. This shift from crimes against humanity to genocide is not unique to Guatemala.
25 Indeed, the Nazi death camps were preceded by the brutal wave of selective killings
26 by the *Einsatzgruppen* (mobile killing units) from 1941 to late 1942, which took the
27 lives of approximately 1.5 million Jews as well as communists, partisans and Polish
28 intellectuals, among others. See R. Rhodes, *Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen*
29 *and the Invention of the Holocaust* (New York: Knopf, 2002). For an excellent analy-
30 sis of genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, see E. Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's*
31 *House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda* (New York: Picador, 2001). On Rwanda,
32 see also M. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the*
33 *Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) and
34 P. Gourevitch *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our*
35 *Families': Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999).
- 36 18. G. Andreopoulos, 'Introduction: The Calculus of Genocide', in *Genocide: Conceptual*
37 *and Historic Dimensions*, ed., G. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia, PA: University of
38 Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 14–15.
- 39 19. G. Black, *Garrison Guatemala* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 11.
- 40 20. US Department of State, 'Secret Memorandum. Reference: Guatemala 6366,'
41 5 October 1981, 1–2 Declassified January 1998.
- 42 21. Unclassified US Department of State. Confidential Action Memorandum To The
Secretary of State; Subject: US Guatemala Relations: Arms Sales. No month or day
specified but text indicates it was written before 4 December 1982 and after
2 November 1982, p. 1.
22. Unclassified US Dept. of State, 1982, p. 2.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
24. For known impact of La Violencia before CEH report, see n.4 above.
25. Article II of the convention. For complete Convention, see I. Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 31–4.

- 1 26. CEH, Vol. 5, p. 42.
- 2 27. For more on 'intentionality', see H. Fein, 'Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity, and War
- 3 Crimes: The Case for Discrimination', *Genocide*, ed., Andreopoulos, pp. 95-107;
- 4 A. L. Hinton, ed., *The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide*
- 5 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); D. Shelton, *Remedies in*
- 6 *International Human Rights Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); P. Ronayne,
- 7 *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the*
- 8 *Holocaust* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001); J. G. Heidenrich,
- 9 *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen*
- 10 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); A. Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens and Genocide:*
- 11 *A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
- 12 Press, 2001); B. Kiernan, ed., *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge,*
- 13 *the United Nations and the International Community* (New Haven, CT: Yale University
- 14 Southeast Asia Studies, 1993).
- 15 28. CEH, Vol. 2, p. 315.
- 16 29. J. Perlin, 'The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds Genocide',
- 17 *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 6 (2000), 396. See also
- 18 B. Duhaime, 'Le Crime de Génocide et le Guatemala: Une Analyse Juridique',
- 19 *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, 29, 3 (1999): 101-6.
- 20 30. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Document Secret G5-41', 5 February 1982, p. 2.
- 21 Declassified January 1998.
- 22 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- 23 32. Perlin, 'The Guatemalan Commission Finds Genocide', 398.
- 24 33. Department of State, 'Secret Memorandum. Reference: Guatemala 6366. 5 October
- 25 1981', pp. 1-2. Declassified January 1998.
- 26 34. CIA, 'Document Secret', pp. 2-3.
- 27 35. See B. Kiernan, *Genocide_Studies@Topica.ca*, 8 March 2002.
- 28 36. Kiernan (*Genocide Studies*) points out that intention is determined by acts carried
- 29 out deliberately rather than simply the motive behind them. Likewise, Shelton
- 30 (email correspondence with author) argues that if genocide is the method to
- 31 obtain land, the goal of obtaining the land does not preclude the intentionality of
- 32 genocide.
- 33 37. Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*, p. 45.
- 34 38. D. Shelton, email communication with author, 12 March 2002. For more on the
- 35 Velasquez-Rodriguez case, see Shelton, *Remedies in International Human Rights Law*,
- 36 p. 221.
- 37 39. Kiernan, *Genocide_Studies@Topica.ca*.
- 38 40. Shelton, email communication with author, 12 March 2002.
- 39 41. Kiernan, *Genocide_Studies@Topica.ca*.
- 40 42. A. Riding, 'Guatemalans Tell of Murder of 300', *New York Times*, 5 October 1982, 7.
- 41 43. *Ibid.*
- 42 44. Perlin, 'The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds Genocide', 399.
45. Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*, p. 47.
46. In the summer of 1995, I witnessed FRG campaign tactics firsthand in the K'iche' communities of San Andrés Sajcabajá. A group of party officials came to town with some 'engineers', who were ostensibly taking census information in order to bring electricity to these villages. As the 'engineers' wrote down the information and took measurements for the power lines, they explained that only houses with a blue flag (like the blue background of FRG) would receive electricity and that to obtain a blue flag, adults in the household needed to present their *cédulas* (national

574 *Genocide in Guatemala*

- 1 identification cards) and sign a document. The document turned out to be FRG
2 party registration. Given that the majority of local community members signed the
3 document with their thumbprint, only those who were literate were able to see that
4 they were not signing up for electricity, but rather for the FRG party.
- 5 47. Analysis on massacres in El Quiché in this section is based on massacre data
6 presented in CEH, Vol. 10.
- 7 48. *Ibid.*
- 8 49. Analysis on massacres in Baja Verapaz in this section is based on massacre data
9 presented in CEH, Vol. 8.
- 10 50. Analysis on massacres in Baja Verapaz in this section is based on massacre data
11 presented in CEH, Vol. 8.
- 12 51. Analysis on massacres in Baja Verapaz in this section is based on massacre data
13 presented in CEH, Vol. 8.
- 14 52. Analysis on massacres in Baja Verapaz in this section is based on massacre data
15 presented in CEH, Vol. 8.
- 16 53. For more on Plan Victoria, see Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*; Barry,
17 *Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency*; Guatemalan Church in Exile, *Guatemala:
18 Security, Development and Democracy* (n.p.: Guatemalan Church in Exile, 1989);
19 H. Gramajo, *De la guerra. ... A la guerra* (Guatemala City: Fondo de Cultura Editorial,
20 S.A., 1995).
- 21 54. Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*, p. 44.
- 22 55. *Ibid.*
- 23 56. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
- 24 57. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.
- 25 58. Perlin, 'The Guatemalan Commission Finds Genocide', 407.
- 26 59. *Ibid.*, 411.
- 27 60. CEH, Vol. 10, pp. 1012–213; Vol. 11, pp. 1384–8.
- 28 61. Schirmer writes (*The Guatemalan Military Project*, p. 45): 'No distinction is made
29 between combatant and noncombatant ...'
- 30 62. CEH, Vol. 7, p. 10.
- 31 63. CEH, Vol. 10.
- 32 64. CEH, Vol. 2, pp. 226–7.
- 33 65. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
- 34 66. CEH, Vol. 7, p. 164.
- 35 67. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
- 36 68. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
- 37 69. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- 38 70. For excellent analysis on the history and systematic incorporation of PACs into
39 military strategy, see CEH, Vol. 2, pp. 158–234; ODHA, *Nunca Más*, Vol. 2,
40 pp. 113–58.
- 41 71. Ejército de Guatemala, *Las patrullas de autodefensa civil: La respuesta popular al
42 proceso de integración socio-económico-político en la Guatemala actual* (Guatemala
City: Editorial del Ejército, 1984), p. 16.
72. E. G. Martin, 'The Right Way to Fight Anti-Guerrilla Warfare', *Wall Street Journal*,
30 July 1981, 5.
73. Department of Defense, School of the Americas Academic Records 1947–1991,
School of the Americas Yearly Lists of Guatemalan military officers trained at SOA
released under Freedom of Information Act. The US Marines receive this same
training. See Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps (MCI) 15 July 1997,

- 1 *Operations Against Guerrilla Units*, 1–23: ‘Your objective is to KILL GUERRILLAS,
2 NOT to hold terrain’ [emphasis in original].
- 3 74. P. Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Vintage, 1988), p. 41.
- 4 75. This 30 percent draws on testimonies from massacres survivors in Ixil, K’iche’, Achi,
5 Keq’chi’, and Kaqchiquel communities.
- 6 76. Nebaj testimony 6a C 3N6, 15 March 1997, p. 2.
- 7 77. Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved*, p. 79.
- 8 78. Nebaj testimony C 18 BN12, 14 March 1997, p. 1 of 1, b.
- 9 79. Levi, *Survival in Auschwitz*, p. 22.
- 10 80. ‘Development as Counterinsurgency’, *Central America Report*, 29 (July/August
11 1986): 1.
- 12 81. Guatemalan Church in Exile (GCE), ‘Las Coordinadores Interinstitucionales’,
13 *Guatemalan Church in Exile*, 5, 2 (1985): 21.
- 14 82. *Ibid.*
- 15 83. A. Michaels, ‘Poverty and Despair Prevail in Guatemala’s “Model Villages”’,
16 *The Guardian*, 16 September 1987, 11.
- 17 84. Barry, *Politics of Counterinsurgency*, p. 23.
- 18 85. M. Simons, ‘Massacres Spreading Terror in the Villages of the Maya’, *New York
19 Times*, 15 September 1982, 4. This article by Simons and articles by other journalists
20 previously cited indicate there was international knowledge of the massacres and
21 the incarceration of survivors by the Guatemalan army as the events unfolded –
22 despite President Reagan’s support of the regime. Indeed, a coalition of Native
23 American organizations, Oxfam, and Cultural Survival, among others, ran a full-
24 page advertisement in the *New York Times* denouncing the massacres. See ‘Help
25 Stop the War Against the Maya Indians of Guatemala’, *New York Times*, 3 January
26 1984, 9.
- 27 86. *Central America Report*, 29 (July/August 1986), 12.
- 28 87. *Guatemalan Church in Exile*, 4, 5 (September/October 1984), 6.
- 29 88. *Central America Report*, 29 (July/August 1986), 12.
- 30 89. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 23 January 1985, F5. In numerous testimonies in the Ixil
31 Area as well as other Maya communities throughout the country, survivors consis-
32 tently gave testimony to the need for permission from the army for any movement
33 between or outside of villages and towns. Moreover, these authorizations quickly
34 became a source of income through illegal taxing by military commissioners.
- 35 90. *Guatemala Human Rights Commission* (October 1987): 11.
- 36 91. Taussig, ‘Culture of Terror’, 469.
- 37 92. M. A. Asturias, *Hombres de Maíz* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, SA, 1957), p. 12.
- 38 93. See ‘Popol Vuh’, trans., D. Tedlock, in *Popol Vuh - The Definitive Edition of the Mayan
39 Book of the Dawn of Life and the Glories of Gods and Kings* (New York: Simon and
40 Schuster, 1985); P. Mcanany, *Living with the Ancestors: Kinship and Kingship in
41 Ancient Maya Society* (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1995); and Asturias, *Hombres
42 de Maíz*.
94. Perlin, ‘The Guatemalan Commission Finds Genocide’, 402.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, 402–3.
97. Nebaj testimony 3N8, 11 March 1997, p. 1 of 1.
98. www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec_116_esp.pdf.
99. www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec_105_esp.pdf.
100. For more on the Rio Negro Trial, see Sanford, *Buried Secrets*.

576 *Genocide in Guatemala*

- 1 101. *El Periodico* (Guatemala), 8 July 2006, 1.
- 2 102. General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia appears to have died in Venezuela shortly
- 3 before the arrest order was issued. The Spanish Court included his name in the
- 4 Arrest Warrant because no death certificate was provided to them to demonstrate
- 5 his death.
- 6 103. See P. Alston, *Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of*
- 7 *Disappearances and Summary Executions. Report of the Special Rapporteur on*
- 8 *extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions*, Philip Alston. *Mission to*
- 9 *Guatemala, 21-25 August 2006 (19 February 2007)*, p. 5.

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